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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DINO JONES, : Case No. 960072-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment of 
conviction entered on January 11, 1996. A copy of that Judgment 
is contained in Addendum A. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
ISSUE: Did the trial judge commit reversible error in 
failing to hold the required hearing to determine whether 
Defendant/Appellant Dino Jones ("Appellant," "Dino" or "Jones") 
was guilty and mentally ill? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue involves a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) ("A trial court's interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law" that is reviewed for correctness); 
see generally State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) 
(reviewing trial court's ruling for correctness). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE: Defense counsel requested 
that the trial court hold the required hearing to determine 
whether Jones was currently mentally ill, and argued that failure 
to hold the hearing violated the statute and Jones' right to 
confrontation and due process. R. 140. 
TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following determinative statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in this brief or in 
Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (1995) 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant/Appellant Dino Jones, a sixteen-year-old 
juvenile at the time of the incident in this case, was certified 
to stand trial as an adult. R. 06. In an Amended Information 
dated February 15, 1995, the State charged Jones with criminal 
homicide, Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995) .x On November 6, 1995, Jones pled 
guilty and mentally ill to the amended charge of Manslaughter, a 
second degree felony. R. 67-73, 75-76. 
The court ordered Jones be remanded and transported to 
the custody of the Utah State Hospital for a mental evaluation as 
to whether Jones was presently mentally ill. R. 76-78. He also 
1
 The Amended Information is not numbered in the District 
Court file. It can be located on the left flap of the official 
District Court file. 
2 
ordered that Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") prepare a 
presentence report. R. 78. The trial judge set sentencing for 
December 18, 1995. R. 81. 
At the sentencing hearing scheduled for December 18, 
1995, the trial judge continued the sentencing to January 11, 
1996. R. 83. At the January 11, 1996 sentencing, defense 
counsel requested that the required presentence hearing to 
determine whether Jones was currently guilty and mentally ill be 
held. R. 120. The trial judge denied the request and sentenced 
Jones to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
R. 88, 171. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
A. THE INCIDENT 
Dino Jones, who was sixteen years old at the time of the 
incident, was in Salt Lake City with his mother. R. 141. Dino, 
a full-blooded Navajo, lived on the reservation near Chinle, 
Arizona, but had lived in Salt Lake City in the past. R. 141, 
142. 
On the night of October 1, 1994, Dino looked up his old 
friend, Gordon Kee. R. 142. Gordon was also under eighteen 
years of age. Dino went to Gordon's house and joined a group of 
four or five kids who were hanging out. R. 142. Gordon Kee and 
2
 This case did not go to trial. Both defense counsel and 
the prosecutor discussed the facts surrounding the incident during 
sentencing. The portion of this fact statement which refers to the 
facts surrounding the incident is taken from those sentencing 
arguments. 
3 
Jonathan Williams were two members of that group. R. 142. 
Prior to Dino's arrival, Gordon and Jonathan had gotten 
several bottles of potent malt liquor. R. 143. The group left 
Gordon's house and walked around town drinking the liquor. 
R. 143. 
As they walked and drank, they talked about things, 
including gangs. R. 143. Dino, Jonathan and Gordon all talked 
about gangs. R. 143. Dino boasted to the group that he was in a 
gang in Arizona. R. 143.3 Jonathan said that he was in a gang 
in Salt Lake, and Gordon said that he had been in a gang but left 
it. R. 143. 
Dino had a gun which he showed to the group. R. 143. 
Dino took the clip out, and everyone handled the gun. R. 143. 
The clip, which had only one bullet in it, was in and out of the 
gun all night. R. 148. The group walked around, drank, handled 
the gun, and talked. R. 144. Dino explained to the group that a 
gang initiation rite in Arizona included the holding of a loaded 
gun to the head of the person who wanted to be in the gang. 
R. 144. If the person did not become scared or cry when the gun 
was pointed at his head, he passed the test. R. 146. Dino 
demonstrated the initiation rite to the group by pointing the gun 
at Gordon Kee's head while the group was behind Trolley Corners. 
R. 14 6. The gun did not discharge. R. 146. 
3
 Defense counsel questioned during sentencing whether Dino, 
living on the reservation in Chinle, Arizona, was actually involved 
in a gang. R. 145. Defense counsel suggested that Dino's comment 
about gang involvement was just talk. R. 145. 
4 
The group left Trolley Corners and went to Gordon Kee's 
apartment. R. 148. Gordon's sister lived next door to Gordon 
and asked the group to babysit. R. 148. A 12-pack of beer was 
purchased for them. R. 148. When the group was in the house, 
Dino gave the gun to Gordon, who hid it. R. 14 8. Dino, Jonathan 
and Gordon further discussed gangs and decided to "jump" or 
initiate each other into a gang. R. 149. 
According to Jonathan, Jonathan went into the bathroom, 
and when he exited, he saw Dino and Gordon in the kitchen, with 
Dino holding the gun to Gordon's head. R. 14 9. The gun 
discharged while Dino was holding it to Gordon's head, and Gordon 
slumped to the ground. R. 150. 
Dino would have testified that the three of them agreed 
that they would "jump" or initiate each other into a gang, and 
that Dino would hold the gun to the heads of the two other boys 
because Dino was the only one who had a connection with the gang 
that used this rite. R. 150. There was nothing that suggested 
that there was animosity between Dino and Gordon or that the 
incident involved anything other than an initiation rite where 
the gun accidentally discharged. R. 150. Although the State 
contended that the discharge of the gun was a reckless act, it 
did not claim that Dino intended to shoot the gun or hurt Gordon. 
Dino indicated that he did not know that the gun was in a 
position to go off. R. 152. The clip, containing one bullet, 
had been in and out of the gun a number of times during the 
evening. R. 164. Jonathan claimed that after the gun went off, 
5 
Dino looked at him and said, "What are you looking at, bitch?," 
then chased Jonathan. R. 151, 158. Dino denies this and says he 
ran because he was scared. R. 151. Neither Jonathan nor Dino 
tried to get medical assistance for Gordon. R. 159. 
B. APPELLANT'S MENTAL HEALTH 
The presentence report indicates that Dino reported his 
mental health as "bad and confused." R. 189. Dino also reported 
that he had tried to commit suicide "on at least two occasions." 
R. 189. Dino was referred to Chinle Mental Health after a 
March 9, 1995 suicide attempt. R. 189. Thereafter, he was 
hospitalized for 24 days at Aspen Hills Treatment Center. 
R. 189-90. Dino's symptoms "were complex and diagnosis was 
difficult." R. 190. The psychiatrist ultimately diagnosed: 
"Psychotic Disorder, NOS, Inhalant Abuse, Oppositional Defiant 
Disorder, R/O Conduct Disorder and Depressive Disorder followed 
by NOS." R. 190. The psychiatrist recommended out-patient 
treatment and continued medication. R. 190. 
All of the professionals who treated and/or diagnosed 
Dino, except those at the Utah State Hospital, have recognized 
that he is mentally ill and requires treatment. R. 190, 248, 
286-89, 328-29. With the exception of the two reports from the 
Utah State Hospital, the remainder of the reports submitted to 
the trial judge indicate a history of delusional thinking, 
suicidal tendencies, depression, and diagnoses of psychoses. 
Neuropsychological Associates determined that Dino suffers from 
mental illness as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(4) (1995) 
6 
and that his competency to proceed in this case was marginal. 
R. 190. His "IQ falls within the Borderline Intellectual 
Functioning diagnostic criteria." R. 207. 
Dr. Gregory disagreed with the Utah State Hospital 
diagnosis of "Malingering" and attributed that diagnosis in part 
to "inappropriate use and interpretation of test data." R. 207. 
Dr. Gregory pointed out that the Hospital inappropriately 
administered the MMPI-2 and MCMI-III to Dino because those tests 
"are administered to adults (at least 18 years of age) who have 
an eighth grade reading level." R. 207. Dino is an adolescent 
with substandard reading skills. R. 207-08. 
Dino reported visual and auditory hallucinations while 
incarcerated. "A goat has followed Dino 'for years7 and appeared 
to him while in detention." R. 328. He also saw the victim in 
this case while in detention. R. 329. 
The doctor who treated Dino at Aspen Hills Hospital after 
a suicide attempt in March 1993 assessed him as suffering from 
"psychotic disorder NOS." R. 248. She indicated Dino did not 
want to stay at the hospital if his sister were discharged. 
R. 248.4 Dino "was quite guarded about [his] delusions and a 
little reticent to talk." R. 248. He indicated, however, that 
he "continue[d] to believe that Mara did control his thoughts and 
that he is capable of communicating telepathically with his 
sister." R. 248. The remainder of the Aspen Hills report, 
4
 Dino's sister was treated as an out-patient by the same 
hospital. R. 250; see also R. 284. 
7 
prepared by a medical doctor when Dino was not facing criminal 
charges and would have liked to be released, reflects delusional 
episodes and psychotic behavior. R. 250-75. 
Shortly after Dino was arrested in this case, Dr. Mirow 
evaluated Dino while he was in juvenile detention. Her report 
indicates that Dino reported hearing girls' voices since he was 
thirteen or fourteen years of age. R. 286. Dr. Mirow recognized 
that Dino has poor verbal skills in English. R. 288. She also 
recognized his need for treatment. R. 289. 
Dino suffered from extensive mental and physical abuse as 
a child. R. 292. He hit his head on the dashboard in an 
automobile accident as an infant and was involved in at least two 
other automobile accidents. R. 291-92. He also had a serious 
problem with inhalant abuse which began at the age of seven. 
R. 212. 
In contrast to all of the other examiners, the Utah State 
Hospital concluded that Dino is not mentally ill. R. 190, 212, 
219. Dr. Wooten's report suggests that Dino "would do almost 
anything to avoid" being tried as an adult and sent to prison and 
that he was malingering. R. 190, 217. The report also suggests 
that Dino is dangerous and belongs in prison. R. 190. The 
Hospital also discounted Dino's fear of seeing a skinwalker and 
references to being a coyote as being based on Dino's training as 
a medicine man and therefore not unusual. R. 216. 
The Hospital determined that the first MMPI-2 
administered to Dino was invalid because Dino told the examiner 
8 
he "just put down any answer because the test was hard to 
understand." R. 217. The examiner then read the test to Dino; 
the results again were "invalid." The Hospital indicated that 
invalid results are "usually associated with (1) not being able 
to read items, (2) random responding, (3) being truly psychotic, 
or (4) Malingering." R. 217. Despite Dino's language and 
cognitive difficulties and his history of mental illness, the 
Hospital concluded that the invalid test results were due to 
"Malingering." R. 217. Eric Nielsen, a social worker to whom 
Dino was referred by the Hospital, reached conclusions similar to 
those of Dr. Wooten. R. 220-224. 
The State argued that the judge should send Dino to 
prison regardless of whether he is mentally ill because he had 
received maximum benefit at the Hospital. Without holding a 
hearing to determine whether Dino was mentally ill at the time of 
sentencing and without ruling on that issue, the judge sentenced 
Dino to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
R. 88, 171. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1995) requires that a 
hearing be held to determine whether a defendant is currently 
mentally ill and that the judge enter findings on that issue 
prior to imposition of sentence. The statute indicates that the 
hearing and findings are a prerequisite to a determination of 
whether the plea of guilty and mentally ill will be entered. In 
this case, the trial judge did not hold the required hearing or 
9 
make findings as to whether Dino was currently mentally ill. 
Case law instructs that where the required hearing is not held 
and the required findings are not made, the case must be reversed 
and remanded for such procedures. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO FOLLOW THE 
STATUTE AND VIOLATED JONES' RIGHT TO STATE AND 
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS BY REFUSING TO HOLD A HEARING 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER JONES WAS MENTALLY ILL AT 
THE TIME OF SENTENCING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1) (1995) provides: 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being 
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine whether the defendant is mentally ill. 
(emphasis added). See Addendum B for entire text of statute. 
The focus at the hearing is on the defendant's current mental 
state, not his or her mental state at the time of the crime. 
State v. DePlontv, 749 P.2d 621, 625 (Utah 1987). If the trial 
judge finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, the 
"plea remains a valid plea of guilty, and the defendant shall be 
sentenced as any other offender." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-
103(3) (b) . 
Where the trial judge finds that the defendant is 
currently mentally ill, the plea of guilty and mentally ill is 
accepted. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103(4). The trial judge is 
required to impose the statutory sentence of the crime and select 
one of three commitment options. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-
103(4), 77-16a-104 (3) . Those options are: (1) commitment to the 
10 
Department of Human Services if the judge finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant's mental illness "poses an 
immediate physical danger to self or others . . . or [the 
defendant] lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of 
life . . . " and "the department is able to provide the defendant 
with treatment, care, custody and security that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs"; 
(2) probation in accordance with § 77-16a-201; or (3) commitment 
to the Department of Corrections if the requirements for 
probation or commitment to the Department of Human Services are 
not met. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (Supp. 1995). 
The mandatory language of § 77-16a-103 requires a judge 
to hold a hearing after the plea is entered and prior to 
sentencing to determine whether the defendant is currently 
mentally ill. See State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 625 (Utah 
1987) ("the court must conduct a hearing to determine the 
defendant's current mental state"); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1271 (Utah 1988) (under former Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5, 
the trial court was required to hold a hearing to determine the 
defendant's mental state); State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27 (Utah 
1990) (pursuant to § 77-35-21.5, court held an evidentiary 
hearing to determine defendant's mental state). 
The requirement in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 that a 
trial judge shall hold a hearing to determine whether the 
defendant is currently mentally ill is mandatory due to the word 
"shall" in the statute. See DePlonty, 749 P.2d at 625 
11 
(interpreting "shall" to impose "mandatory obligation" to order 
examination under § 77-16-1); Jones by and through Jones v. 
Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992) (construing 
the term "shall" as mandatory); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 
(Utah 1989) (same). "Utah courts construing statutes containing 
the term 'shall' generally have concluded that term is 
mandatory." See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. 
Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); Jones, 834 
P.2d at 559. 
Additionally, § 77-16a-103 requires a finding by the 
judge as to whether the defendant is currently mentally ill. See 
DePlonty, 749 P.2d at 626; see State v. Labrum, 293 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 19 (Utah 1996) (petition for reh'g pending). A defendant 
who is not currently mentally ill is sentenced pursuant to 
§ 77-16a-103 (3) (b) . On the other hand, where the defendant is 
currently mentally ill, the defendant is sentenced to one of the 
three options available under § 77-16a-104(3). While, under 
either scenario, the defendant may ultimately be sentenced to 
prison, the guilty and mentally ill statutory scheme, when read 
as a whole, requires a finding by the judge as to whether the 
defendant is currently mentally ill. See generally Labrum, 293 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 21 (holding that gang enhancement statute 
requires trial judge to make written findings). 
In Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing to 
determine whether the defendant was currently mentally ill, and 
12 
remanded the case, ordering the trial court to conduct the 
required hearing.5 The trial judge in Copeland found the 
defendant mentally ill, but sentenced him to the Utah State 
Prison rather than the Utah State Hospital for treatment. 
Because the trial judge had not held the required hearing, the 
Supreme Court ordered that the case be remanded for such a 
hearing. See also DePlonty, 749 P.2d at 626 (remanded for 
required hearing). 
5
 The guilty and mentally ill provision in effect when 
Copeland was tried was found at Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 
1988). That section stated in part: 
If the defendant is found guilty and mentally ill, 
the court shall impose any sentence which could be 
imposed under law upon a defendant who is 
convicted of the same offense. Before sentencing 
the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the 
defendant's present mental state. 
(emphasis added). 
The relevant portions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 are 
substantially similar. That section states in part: 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being 
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine whether the defendant is mentally ill. 
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is 
currently mentally ill, his plea shall be accepted 
and he shall be sentenced in accordance with 
Section 77-16a-104. 
(emphasis added). Subsection (1) and (4) of Section 77-16a-103 
contemplate that the judge will hold a hearing to determine whether 
the defendant is currently mentally ill and make findings on that 
issue. Neither was done in this case. Hence, the Copeland holding 
controls despite the change in language and location of the GAMI 
statute. 
13 
In DePlontv. 74 9 P.2d at 62 6, the Utah Supreme Court 
directed trial judges to "make complete findings of fact and 
conclusions of law" at the conclusion of the hearing to determine 
the defendant's current mental state " [t]o assure that the 
statutory scheme is properly effectuated." DePlonty, 749 P.2d at 
6266; see also State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) 
(judge made written findings of fact and conclusions of law at 
conclusion of hearing to determine defendant's current mental 
state); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah App. 1994) 
(after hearing, judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law); Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the present case, the trial judge did not hold a 
hearing to determine Dino's current mental state as mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. Nor did the trial judge make a 
finding as to whether Jones was currently mentally ill. Pursuant 
to the Supreme Court holding in Copeland, the proper remedy where 
the trial court fails to hold the required hearing is remand with 
an order that such hearing be held. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271. 
See also DePlontv, 749 P.2d at 626; Labrum, 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 21 (case remanded for findings where trial judge failed to 
make findings required by gang enhancement statute). 
After Jones entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill to 
Manslaughter, the trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing, 
6
 DePlontv, Anderson and Copeland were decided under former 
§ 77-35-21.5. The language of that statute was substantially 
similar to that of § 77-16a-103 except that § 77-35-21.5 contained 
three subsections which were later found to be unconstitutional. 
See State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271-72; fn. 5 supra at 13. 
14 
referred Dino to Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence 
report, and remanded Dino to the custody of the Utah State 
Hospital for a mental evaluation. R. 67, 75-76, 78. 
On January 11, 1996, the parties appeared for sentencing. 
R. 120. In response to the trial judge's standard opening query 
as to whether there was any legal reason why sentence should not 
be imposed, defense counsel indicated that there was such a legal 
reason in that the trial judge had not held the hearing required 
under § 77-16a-103. R. 120. 
The trial judge indicated that he could send Dino to the 
prison regardless of whether he determined that Dino was mentally 
ill. R. 1341. He stated: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you what you'd have 
me do, [Mr. Defense Counsel], if I were even to 
accept all of what you have said. The first 
thing you said was that you think we ought to 
have a hearing on his mental capacity. But let's 
assume for a minute that I have that hearing on 
his mental capacity, and conclude he's 
incompetent. 
There is no reason for me to decide that I 
could send him --or maybe I should change to it 
to this question: is there any reason for me to 
decide I should send him to the state hospital 
instead of the state prison? There are certainly 
persons in the state prison that are suffering 
from mental illness. And the real question that 
I'm concerned with is sentencing here today. 
Whether I can impose sentence on -- I suppose the 
other alternative would be to simply offer that 
you withdraw your plea and set the matter down 
for trial. 
R. 131. 
The trial judge apparently had determined that he would 
sentence Dino to prison regardless of what was said at a hearing. 
Because the statute allows a trial judge to send a defendant who 
15 
is currently mentally ill to prison, the trial judge apparently 
determined that a hearing and finding as to whether Dino was 
currently mentally ill was not necessary. Such an approach 
violates the plain language of the statute and the basic tenets 
of due process of law. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271. 
Contrary to the judge's determination, Section 77-16a-103 
requires that a hearing to determine whether the defendant is 
currently mentally ill be held prior to sentencing. The hearing 
and findings are prerequisites under the statute to a 
determination of whether the plea of guilty and mentally ill is 
accepted. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103(3),(4) (1995). As defense 
counsel pointed out, the alienists came to very different 
conclusions in this case as to whether Dino was currently 
mentally ill. R. 121. The doctors at the Utah State Hospital 
concluded that Dino was not currently mentally ill whereas 
Dr. Gregory and every other expert concluded that he was mentally 
ill. R. 122-23. Dr. Gregory diagnosed brain damage, major 
depressive disorder, language disorders, and various deficits in 
intellectual functioning. R. 124. 
Defense counsel questioned the conclusions of the doctors 
from the Hospital, pointing out that they relied on tests which 
required a reading and language ability which Dino does not 
possess, then determined that he was malingering based on his 
answers on tests he could not read or understand. R. 125. 
Defense counsel questioned the validity of the testing done by 
the two doctors from the Hospital as well as the interpretation 
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of that testing. R. 134. Both of the evaluators who determined 
Dino is not mentally ill work at the Hospital and have an 
apparent conflict since they are also concerned with 
administration of the Hospital. Cross-examination of the two 
evaluators would have allowed defense counsel to examine their 
biases, if any, in evaluating Dino as well as the procedures 
utilized and the bases for their opinions. 
In addition, after Dino, whose preferred language is 
Navajo, requested that the material be read to him in Navajo, one 
of the doctors at the Hospital determined that Dino was 
attempting to manipulate the evaluator. R. 126. Defense counsel 
pointed out that in order to work with and test Dino, the defense 
had hired a Navajo woman, Virginia Howard. Dino was saying 
things which counsel labeled as "bizarre," so the Navajo woman 
was hired to aid the defense in determining whether Dino's 
"bizarre" statements had cultural significance or indicated a 
mental illness. R. 126. Ms. Howard informed the defense that 
Dino was more conversant and better able to comprehend in the 
Navajo language than in English. R. 127. Counsel pointed out 
that Dino's test scores reflected brain damage and/or a language 
problem which probably factored heavily into Dino's performance. 
R. 128. 
Defense counsel further noted that on more than one 
occasion, Dino had attempted suicide. R. 122-23. In one of 
those attempts, Dino put a rope around his neck and became 
unconscious before the rope broke, and woke up in a mental 
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hospital. R. 123. The reports from the hospital described major 
psychiatric disorders including hallucinations and a belief that 
Dino had the ability to communicate telepathically with others by 
broadcasting his thoughts. R. 123. Juvenile court evaluations 
in January 1995 included diagnoses for major psychiatric 
disturbance and post-traumatic stress disorder, and recommended 
further evaluations for psychiatric disorders. R. 123. 
In addition, other than the two doctors at the State 
Hospital, everyone who had evaluated or treated Dino "concluded 
he has a major depressive disorder, at times peppered with 
psychotic features." R. 129. He had a history of audio and 
visual hallucinations. R. 129. 
Had the trial court held the required hearing, defense 
counsel would have been given an opportunity to examine the two 
evaluators from the Hospital and the judge may well have 
determined that Dino was currently mentally ill and belonged at 
the Utah State Hospital rather than the Utah State Prison. 
Additionally, even if the judge determined Dino was mentally ill 
but sentenced him to prison, Dino conceivably would have possible 
access to different resources in the Prison than he would have 
without the finding of mental illness. R. 172. By refusing to 
hold a hearing, the trial judge violated the statutory language 
and Dino's right to federal due process. This error requires 
that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded for a hearing 
and findings as to whether Dino is currently mentally ill. See 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the judgment and remand this case for the required hearing as to 
whether Dino is mentally ill. 
SUBMITTED this o? 7*" day of November, 1996. 
(ZM^C uJcO/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MARK R. MOFFAT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
r.'^,rr-'*r'ftS?^*2•*• JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS. 
/41L*D uka. L 
( llhk <&Jby UezpJrJ*) 
Defendant. 
Case No. . 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter _ 
Bailiff 
Date 
(COMMITMENT) 
95/90 fa/l 
m.f.1^7 <L^—v 1 — 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; JS plea of guilty;^ ftu*cfciMi/ 
D plea Qf no contest; of the offense of //] 0<n<cJ((lu/tf/Xc^-J 
of the Q^ i i l eg ree , D a class misdemeanor, being now preseriJUn cpurt and ready for sentence and 
represented hy j \ /k^/f/3L^» a n d t h e State being represented by (j jt^AA^kb^^^ j s now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, JSTOW sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: ^ 
a felony JULC f 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
fef of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
yi and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $i 
% and ordered to pay restitution iri tho amount of $• to U<\ 
%D 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, D Court,, Count(s) 
Defei bove 
*s*f\J^Hs{ 4-n Qi 
hereby are dismissed. 
LC.J// &£-
D f ndant is granted a stay of the a6 ( • prison) sentence and placed omprobation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
* 
Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County j&for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue ^L4AJ^AJM 
dance ith 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page IcJ. 
A A n r\ 
ADDENDUM B 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16A. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL 
PERSONS 
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ELL 
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions 
s 77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge, 
the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether the defendant is 
mentally ill. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant, and may receive the 
testimony of any public or private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. 
The defendant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that examination only upon 
approval by the executive director. 
(3)(a) A defendant who tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill shall be examined first 
by the trial judge, in compliance with the standards for taking pleas of guilty. The 
defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a 
contingent plea. 
(b) If the defendant is later found not to be mentally ill, that plea remains a valid plea of 
guilty, and the defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender. 
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his plea shall be 
accepted and he shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 77-16a-104. 
(5)(a) When the offense is a state offense, expenses of examination, observation, and 
treatment for the defendant shall be paid by the department. 
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by the county where prosecution is commenced. 
(c) Expenses of examination for defendants charged with violation of a municipal or 
county ordinance shall be paid by the municipality or county that commenced the 
prosecution. 
As enacted by Chapter 171, Laws of Utah 1992. 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 16A. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL 
PERSONS 
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions 
s 77-16a-104. Verdict of guilty and mentally ill-Hearing to determine present mental 
state 
(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any lesser 
offense, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's present mental state. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to determine his 
mental condition, and may receive the evidence of any public or private expert witness 
offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The defendant may be placed in the Utah State 
Hospital for that examination only upon approval of the executive director. 
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is currently 
mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant 
who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the same offense, and: 
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of Section 
77-16a-202, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(i) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to self 
or others, including jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, 
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and 
(ii) the department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, care, custody, and 
security that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs. In order 
to insure that the requirements of this subsection are met, the court shall notify the executive 
director of the proposed placement and provide the department with an opportunity to 
evaluate the defendant and make a recommendation to the court regarding placement prior to 
commitment; 
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or 
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the defendant in the 
custody of UDC. 
(4) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the 
defendant as it would any other defendant. 
(5) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in accordance 
with Subsection 77-16a-103(5). 
Added by Laws 1992, c. 171. Amended by Laws 1995, c. 254, s 2, eff. May 1, 1995. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
77-35-21.5. Rule 21.5 — Plea claiming men-
tal illness or insanity — Expenses of 
examination and treatment — Proce-
dures — Verdict — Sentence — Com-
mitment — Discharge — Prison sen-
tence — Parole — Commitment to Psy-
chiatric Security Review Board — Pro-
bation [Repealed effective July 1, 
1990]. 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being 
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall 
hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine 
the claim of mental illness of the defendant Mental 
illness, for this purpose, is determined by the defini-
tion stated m Subsection 76-2-305(4) The court may 
order the defendant to be evaluated at the Utah State 
Hospital or any other suitable facility, and may re-
ceive the evidence of any private or public expert wit-
ness whose evidence is offered by the defendant or the 
prosecutor A defendant who tenders a plea of "guilty 
and mentally ill" shall be examined first by the trial 
judge m compliance with the standards for taking 
pleas of guilty The defendant shall be advised that a 
plea of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and 
not a contingent plea If the defendant is later found 
not to be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise lawfully 
made remains a valid plea of guilty The defendant 
shall be sentenced as any other offender If the court 
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally 
ill, applying the standards set forth in this section, 
the defendant's plea shall be accepted and he shall be 
sentenced as a mentally ill offender Expenses of ex-
amination, observation, or treatment excluding 
travel to and from any mental health facility, shall be 
charged to the county When the offense is a state 
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense Travel 
expenses shall be charged to the county where prose-
cution is commenced Examination of defendants 
charged with municipal or county ordinance viola-
tions shall be charged to the municipality or county 
commencing the prosecution 
(2) (a) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of 
"not guilty by reason of insanity," the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may find the defendant 
guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insan-
ity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser of-
fense, or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental 
illness but not an illness which would warrant 
full exoneration 
(b) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to 
the offense charged, or any lesser offense, the 
court shall hold a hearing as provided in this 
section, and if the court finds that the defendant 
is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the 
defendant as a mentally ill offender 
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally 
ill, the court shall impose any sentence which could 
be imposed under law upon a defendant who is con-
victed of the same offense Before sentencing, the 
court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defen-
dant's present mental state 
(4) The court shall, in its sentence, order commit-
ment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2 and 
hospitalization at the Utah State Hospital if, upon 
completion of the hearing and consideration of the 
record, the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that 
(a) the defendant has a mental illness as de-
fined by Subsection 76-2-305(4), 
(b) because of his mental illness the defendant 
poses an immediate physical danger to others or 
self, which may include jeopardizing his own or 
others safety health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic necessities of life, 
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on 
probation, 
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to engage in 
a rational decision-making process regarding the 
acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated 
by evidence of inability to weigh the possible 
costs and benefits of treatment, 
(d) there is no appropriate treatment alterna-
tive to a court order of hospitalization, and 
(e) the Utah State Hospital is able to provide 
the defendant with treatment, care, and custody 
that is adequate and appropriate to the defen-
dant's conditions and needs 
(5) The period of commitment to the jurisdiction of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board under this sec-
tion may in no circumstance be longer than the maxi-
mum sentence imposed by the court 
(6) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board proposes to discharge a defendant from the 
Utah State Hospital prior to the expiration of 
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of Par-
dons a report on the condition of the defendant, 
including the clinical facts, the diagnosis, the 
course of treatment, the prognosis for the remis-
sion of symptoms, the potential for recidivism 
and for the danger to himself or the public, and 
recommendations for future treatment The 
Board of Pardons shall direct that the defendant 
serve any or all of the unexpired term of the sen-
tence at the Utah State Prison, place the defen-
dant on parole, or commit the defendant to the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board for conditional release m accordance with 
Chapter 38 
(b) If the Board of Pardons, under law or ad-
ministrative rules, considers for parole any de-
fendant who has been adjudged guilty and men-
tally ill, the Board of Pardons shall consult with 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board An addi-
tional report on the condition of the defendant 
may be filed with the Board of Pardons Pending 
action of the Board of Pardons, the defendant 
shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Psychi-
atric Security Review Board at the Utah State 
Hospital 
(7) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board shall review the condition of each person 
under its jurisdiction at the state hospital under this 
section to determine whether custody can be trans-
ferred to the Board of Pardons 
(8) If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment 
shall, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board, be made a condition of parole 
Failure to continue treatment or other condition of 
parole except by agreement with the designated men-
tal health services provider and the Board of Pardons 
is a basis for initiating parole violation hearings The 
period of parole may not be for fewer than five years 
or until the expiration of the defendant's sentence, 
whichever comes first and may not be reduced with-
out consideration by the Board of Pardons of a cur-
rent report on the mental health status of the of-
fender 
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by 
the sentencing court shall be placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board The Psychiatric Security Review Board 
shall make treatment a condition of probation if 
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facili-
ties exist for treatment of the offender in a proba-
tion status Reports as specified by the trial judge 
shall be filed with the probation officer and the 
sentencing court 
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other con-
dition of probation, except by agreement with the 
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board, is a basis for the initiation of proba-
tion violation hearings The period of probation 
may not be for fewer than five years or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever 
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sen-
tencing court without consideration of a current 
report on the mental health status of the of-
fender 
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided 
by or under contract with the Division of Mental 
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with 
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board, any other mental health provider A re-
port shall be filed with the probation officer and 
the sentencing court every three months during 
the penod of probation If a motion on a petition 
to discontinue probation is made by the defen-
dant, the probation officer shall request a report 
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation 
may not be heard more than once every six 
months 
(10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the 
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility 
under this section pnor to July 1, 1989, the effec-
tive date of this act, the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall peti-
tion the court within 60 days after that date for 
review of those orders The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include commitment 
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board established under Section 77-38-2 
(b) With regard to persons who have been 
placed on probation by the sentencing court un-
der Subsection (9) prior to July 1, 1989, the effec-
tive date of this act, the executive director of the 
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall 
petition the court within 60 days after that date 
for review of those orders The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include placement un-
der the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2 
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